Fenomenologia

(BCDU)
The constellation of concepts grouped around the verb bergen—which is central for Heidegger, since it is explicitly developed elsewhere to explain the concept of truth as Unverborgenheit, on the basis of the Greek alêtheia—refers in German to an original ambivalence given by language. Like the famous verb aufheben at the origin of Hegelian thinking, the verb bergen is ambiguous from the outset, because it means both “conceal” ( like verbergen ) and “bring out” ( for example, victims (…)

(BCDU)
In German, the word Gestell usually means frame( work ), mount, setting. As Heidegger remarks, “In ordinary usage, the word Gestell refers to some kind of apparatus, for example, a bookrack. Gestell is also the name for a skeleton” ( Question concerning Technology ). The word entered the philosophical vocabulary in Heidegger’s work—probably in the 1953 lecture “The Question of Technology,” where it characterized the essence of modern technology—or technology as such. Although it is (…)

(BCDU)
Let us take, as an extreme illustration, the case of Heidegger. In Die Technik und die Kehre, he sets forth his philosophy of technology on the basis of a small group of words whose treatment illustrates perfectly the mechanisms under discussion: the concept is dissociated from ordinary language in accord with principles of combination and re-marking. The word Kehre, which was used from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries and meant “turn,” “return” ( like the plow at the end (…)

(BCDU)
German distinguishes more clearly than English or French between care for oneself or Selbstsorge ( which, Heidegger says, is “tautological,” Being and Time, 366 ), on the one hand, and on the other Fürsorge or “care for the other,” which Macquarrie and Robinson translate not by “care” but by “solicitude” and which the French translator renders as assistance. Solicitude, which is “an affectionate care for others,” has a meaning different from “care” and must be attached to a (…)

(BCDU)
We must note first that “care” does not derive from Latin cura but rather from Old High German or Gothic Kara, which means “care,” “lament,” “sorrow.” The word initially designated a painful mental state such as concern or anxiety, and it was indeed appropriate to use “care” to render the German Sorge as it is used by Heidegger. For Heidegger the very Being of Dasein is “care” ( Sorge ) ( Sein und Zeit ), so that the latter is in the world in the form of Besorgen ( concern ). Cares, (…)

(BCDU)
We have examined what Kant’s immediate successors said about the question of the transcendental imagination. In a sense, however, nothing was said, at least according to an important note in Heidegger’s book on Kant ( Kantbuch GA3, §27 ): The explicit characterization of the power of imagination as a basic faculty [Grundvermögen] must have driven home the meaning of this faculty to Kant’s contemporaries. Thus Fichte and Schelling, and in his own way, Jacobi as well, attributed an (…)

(BCDU)
“Appropriation,” borrowed from Late Latin appropriatio, was used especially in medicine ( in the sense of assimilation ) and in chemistry ( in the sense of catalysis ), before being adopted by philosophy as one of the possible translations of the German word Ereignis ( from the adjective eigen, own, characteristic ) as it is used by Heidegger; see EREIGNIS; cf. DESTINY and EVENT.

(BCDU)
The term “anxiety” is etymologically related to that of “narrowness,” or “tightening,” as are the corresponding Romance and Germanic words, and this can still be sensed in the works of Friedrich Schelling and Jakob Böhme. However, it is above all its elective relationship with nothingness ( as non-being ) and the possibility of the pure state that Heidegger, following Kierkegaard, will emphasize. That Angst, unlike Furcht ( fear ), is “without object” is no less crucial for (…)

(BCDU)
The absurd, as a sensation of the absence of meaning, is also something experienced ( see ERLEBEN ). Defined by Albert Camus as the “mystery and strangeness of the world,” it belongs to the French vocabulary of existentialism, which we have explored in its German source ( see DASEIN ). It is an ontological affect broadly described in the works of Schelling, Kierkegaard, Freud, and Heidegger ( see ANXIETY and, more generally, MALAISE ) in connection with “facticity” ( see TATSACHE, (…)

Esse uso moderno de hypárkhein, para significar o existir de uma coisa qualquer, foi de encontro, em nossa época, ao problema da tradução de “existência” no existencialismo, que não atribui a existência senão ao homem. Já a designação dessa corrente de pensamento opôs duas terminologias: hyparxismós [υπαρξισμός] e existentialismos [έξιστενσιαλισμός]. Hoje, prefere-se a primeira expressão à sua cópia. Mas, se a designação de uma corrente filosófica é matéria de convenção, a tradução do (…)