Fenomenologia

(Sallis1996) Now the beautiful, as we said, shone bright amidst these visions, and in this world below we apprehend it through the clearest of our senses, clear and resplendent. For sight is the keenest mode of perception vouchsafed us through the body; wisdom (phronesis), indeed, we cannot see thereby—how passionate had been our desire for her, if she had granted us so clear an image of herself to gaze upon—nor yet any other of those beloved things, except the beautiful; for the beautiful (…)

(Sallis1996)
The second dimension of Platonic dialogue is that of mythos. It is presumably through its mythical dimension that a dialogue has something corresponding to the feet of a living being, that it has within itself a link to the earth, a bond to something intrinsically opaque, a bond to an element of darkness in contrast to that which is capable of being taken up into the light of logos. However, the contrast must not, in advance, be too rigidly drawn: a mythos is itself something (…)

(Sallis1996)
The second question is: What is logos? This question is less immediately appropriate. In posing it we have in mind the double meaning of the verbal form “legein,” which means both to say, to speak, and to lay in the sense of bringing things to lie together, collecting them, gathering them together; and we have in mind the question posed by this double meaning, namely, the question as to how it is that saying (and, in general, everything that we include under the title (…)

(Sallis2016)
Perhaps the most direct of these paths is that traced, with rare lucidity, in the late essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” Taking as his point of departure the phenomenological appeal to the things themselves (zu den Sachen selbst), Heidegger poses the question: What remains unthought in this appeal? In effect, the question asks: What is required in order for things to show themselves, in order for them to shine forth in their presence? In response, he (…)

(Sallis2016)
A beginning can be discerned in certain directions taken in the development of phenomenology from Heidegger on. Responding to the Nietzschean injunction, Being and Time sets sensible beings free of the intelligible. No longer are they determined as imaging a remote intelligible set beyond them, nor as grounded in the pure concepts of a transcendental subject or of spirit. Rather, they are taken as determined by their insertion in a world, by their placement within the (…)

Quando o neopositivista Rudolf Carnap quis demonstrar que a metafísica é uma falsa ciência porque fala de coisas que não existem ou não existem da maneira como ela as descreve, ele escolheu como exemplo um texto de Heidegger que girava em torno do conceito de nada. Nesse texto, Heidegger contrastava o antigo princípio "do nada, nada surge" com o aforismo "do nada surge tudo o que existe"; ele falava de uma "experiência do nada", do "nada que nadifica", do "nada que se revela", e assim por (…)

A linguagem não é o instrumento que o homem criou para se orientar entre as coisas, dominá-las e utilizá-las, para se comunicar com outros homens e expressar a si mesmo. É uma criação do Ser. Mas o que é o Ser? É Deus? É o Mundo? É algo intermediário entre Deus e o Mundo, um Absoluto, uma Natureza infinita? Heidegger se recusa a responder a essas perguntas; e Foucault faz o mesmo. Se perguntarmos: quem fala?, a resposta de Heidegger e de Foucault é a mesma: é a Palavra que fala, é a (…)

(BSpace)
The individual object however has its place where I look for it and find it, in so far as a place is assigned to it by someone. The place is thus already the result of human creation of order. The manner of assignation can again vary greatly in detail. Things are, to quote Heidegger, ‘as equipment essentially fitted up and installed, set up, and put to rights’. Thus there are very different forms of lying ready, keeping, and so on. I can put a book in order on the bookshelf for (…)

(BSpace)
Thus we define the space of action as the totality of places which include the objects of use around the working individual. Here no object stands alone, but the individual places are ordered into a significant whole, in which each individual object is related to other things with which it belongs. The book stands on the bookshelf, and the bookshelf is on the wall of the study, the washing is in the wardrobe, the pliers are in the toolbox, and so on. Each individual thing is in a (…)

(BSpace)
A suitable starting point is provided by Heidegger’s analysis of human spatiality in Being and time, which, despite being restricted by the different direction of the questions raised in this book, clearly discusses the decisive features of this space. I will follow it, without keeping in detail to the structure required by the total context of the book. The concept of what is ‘ready-to-hand’ which Heidegger applies to the original condition of things, or, in his phrase, of (…)