Sallis (2016) – lugar nas estruturas referenciais do mundo

(Sallis2016)

A beginning can be discerned in certain directions taken in the development of phenomenology from Heidegger on. Responding to the Nietzschean injunction, Being and Time   sets sensible beings free of the intelligible. No longer are they determined as imaging a remote intelligible set beyond them, nor as grounded in the pure concepts of a transcendental subject or of spirit. Rather, they are taken as determined by their insertion in a world, by their placement within the referential structures that constitute a world. The world itself is nothing set beyond the sensible beings within it. Without itself being a sensible being, it belongs nonetheless to the domain of the sensible; it is of the sensible even though not itself a sensible being. Though in Heidegger’s early thought the world is intrinsically bound to the human, this bond is not a grounding, nor is the human taken as a transcendental subject or as spirit. In the development of Heidegger’s thought that begins in Contributions to Philosophy, even this bond is broken, and whatever affinity there might have been with the metaphysics of the subject is eliminated. Merleau-Ponty  ’s conception of the invisible, as that which, without itself being visible, belongs to and indeed renders possible the visible, extends and develops the redetermination of the sensible that frees it from governance by an intelligible beyond.