Fenomenologia

(BSpace)
The individual object however has its place where I look for it and find it, in so far as a place is assigned to it by someone. The place is thus already the result of human creation of order. The manner of assignation can again vary greatly in detail. Things are, to quote Heidegger, ‘as equipment essentially fitted up and installed, set up, and put to rights’. Thus there are very different forms of lying ready, keeping, and so on. I can put a book in order on the bookshelf for (…)

(BSpace)
Thus we define the space of action as the totality of places which include the objects of use around the working individual. Here no object stands alone, but the individual places are ordered into a significant whole, in which each individual object is related to other things with which it belongs. The book stands on the bookshelf, and the bookshelf is on the wall of the study, the washing is in the wardrobe, the pliers are in the toolbox, and so on. Each individual thing is in a (…)

(BSpace)
A suitable starting point is provided by Heidegger’s analysis of human spatiality in Being and time, which, despite being restricted by the different direction of the questions raised in this book, clearly discusses the decisive features of this space. I will follow it, without keeping in detail to the structure required by the total context of the book. The concept of what is ‘ready-to-hand’ which Heidegger applies to the original condition of things, or, in his phrase, of (…)

(BSpace)
Mas, para que o homem possa habitar em seu lugar de morada, de modo a encontrar estabilidade, segurança e paz diante do assalto do mundo, ele precisa proteger essa área por meios adequados. Saint-Exupéry, por exemplo, escreve que defesas firmes são necessárias, sem as quais não se pode viver. E, de fato, na língua alemã, como Heidegger apontou, o "Frieden" [paz] em que se vive está relacionado à "Umfriedung" [cercamento] da área de habitação. Portanto, para habitar em paz, (…)

(BSpace)
Saint-Exupéry, em sua Cidadela, a "cidade no deserto", foi provavelmente o primeiro a enfatizar a importância do habitar. "Descobri uma grande verdade", ele escreve, que é "saber que todos os homens habitam, e que o significado das coisas muda de acordo com o significado de seu lar." Assim, o habitar não é mais uma atividade aleatória como qualquer outra, mas um aspecto da natureza humana que é decisivo para a relação do homem com o mundo em geral. O herói fictício de suas (…)

(BSpace)
Admittedly man today, if he regards his house as the centre of the world, is at a distinct disadvantage with regard to the mythological world image. For mythological man, the centre of the world was objectively rooted with reference to the fixed centre of space as a whole. Dwelling was therefore no problem to him. But since this objective centre has been lost, the anchoring in an objective system is also lost. Man is then in danger of being uprooted. He becomes homeless on earth, (…)

Even though we have refused to regard experienced space, in the sense of mere experience of space, as something merely psychological, it is on the other hand not an object removed from the subject. As we have stressed from the start, it is a question of the relationship between the human being and his space, and thus also of the structure of human existence itself, insofar as this is determined by his relationship with space. It is in this sense that we speak of the spatiality of human (…)

(BSpace)
The problem of time in human existence has preoccupied philosophers to such an extraordinary degree over recent decades that one could almost describe it as the fundamental problem of contemporary philosophy. Bergson was probably the first to formulate it convincingly as that of ‘durée’, concretely experienced as opposed to objectively measurable, and soon afterwards Simmel introduced this question to Germany. Later Heidegger, in the course of his existential ontology, decisively (…)

For Sartre, the primary relation between the for-itself and its world is that of distance, and this distance is breached as consciousness submerges itself in its facticity. The embodiment of consciousness is itself a project in Sartrian terms. Consciousness knows itself primarily as a translucency only dimly aware of its own corporeal dimension. Alienation signifies the initial moment of consciousness’s journey toward self-recovery, a movement to recover oneself as flesh, that is, as a body (…)

Kojève’s view of the paradoxical ontological situation of human beings—not to be what it is (nature), and to be what it is not (consciousness or negation)—has the consequence that human beings are necessarily projected into time. The human “I” is a continual surpassing of itself, an anticipation of the being that it is not yet, as well as an anticipation of the nothingness that will emerge from whatever it at any moment happens to be: “the very being of this I will be becoming, and the (…)