Fenomenologia

El pensamiento que «deja de lado al ser como fundamento», saltando en el Boden y respondiendo al Zuspruch de la presencia como Anwesenlassen, es aquél al que Heidegger define en términos de memoria y rememoración: Denken como Gedächtnis, Denken como Andenken. No es casual que, en el mundo de la metafísica desplegada como técnica tal como está descrito en la frase de Nietzsche sobre el «desierto» que «crece» (cf. WD, 11 y ss.), Mnemosyne no tenga ya derecho de ciudadanía: «la desertización es (…)

Excertos de Mafalda Faria Blanc, O Fundamento em Heidegger, p. 245-248
Deleuze (Cf. Deleuze, Gilles, Différence et Répétition e Logique du Sens) distingue três acepções de fundamento, correspondentes àquelas etapas da história da filosofia, ao longo das quais esta vai realizando a ideia programática de ontologia - a descrição e ordenação das principais estruturas do ser do ente.
A primeira acepção de fundamento é a identidade. Surgindo com a determinação platônica do ser como ideia, ela (…)

Excertos das páginas 23-28, da edição PUF de 1994.
Deux auteurs dominent la nouvelle conception de la philosophie que Heidegger élabore pendant son temps de Privatdozent à Freiburg : Edmund Husserl et Wilhelm Dilthey. Nous examinerons ultérieurement de façon plus détaillée le rapport entre Heidegger et Husserl et les divergences croissantes entre ces deux génies antithétiques, précisément concernant leur conception différente de la phénoménologie. Cette divergence correspond au deuxième (…)

Helena Martins
Finalmente, há o conceito de Eu, e é este o conceito cuja mudança na "reviravolta" é a mais inesperada e também a que tem maiores consequências. Em Ser e Tempo, o termo "Eu" é "a resposta para a questão Quem [é o homem] ?", em oposição à questão "O que ele é "; o Eu é o termo para a existência do homem em oposição a qualquer qualidade que ele possa ter. Essa existência, o "autêntico ser um Eu", é extraída polemicamente do "Eles". ("Mit dem Ausdruck ’Selbst’ antworten wir auf (…)

p. 6-7
Heidegger’s special use of the term “meaning” (Sinn) was pointed out already in our introductory remarks. Our present difficulty thus seems to be purely terminological and should be capable of an easy solution: we must simply find out how Heidegger defines the word “meaning.” The matter, however, is not quite so simple, as can be readily seen when the definition is actually given. Meaning, in Heidegger’s sense, is that from which something is understandable as the thing it is. This (…)

Translator’s Foreword
I. The Group of Words That Gather Around One Single Word
5. Grund and Related Words
The clue to translating words such as Abgrund, Ungrund, Urgrund, gründen, Gründer, and Gründung — all of which directly pertain to being’s sway — is given in the word Grund. Thus, when Heidegger asks, "Why is Da-sein the [Grund] and [Abgrund] for historical man . . . and why should he then not continue to be the way he is?" he alludes to the proximity of Grund to Abgrund. Grund (…)

Translator’s Foreword
I. The Group of Words That Gather Around One Single Word
4. Werfen and Related Words
The root-word for the phenomenological kinship among the words ent-werfen, loswerfen, Entwurf, Entwerfer, Entworfenes, Werfer, Wurf, Gegenwurf, Loswurf, and Geworfenheit — all of which put forth the being-historical thinking of Contributions as an enactment-thinking — is werfen. The orienting power of this word as a being-historical word is unmistakably at work in this family of (…)

Translator’s Foreword
I. The Group of Words That Gather Around One Single Word
3. Wesen and Related Words
One might perhaps say that the words Wesen and Wesung are the most crucial words for translating Contributions. Therefore, when translating Wesen and Wesung into English, it is of paramount importance to convey the richness, complexity, and subtlety that these words have in German. No other word in the entirety of Contributions offers as varied a possibility for the translator as (…)

Translator’s Foreword
I. The Group of Words That Gather Around One Single Word
1. Ereignis and Related Words
We considered the possibility of leaving the word Ereignis untranslated, since we were aware of Heidegger’s own view, corroborated by our understanding of Contributions, that Ereignis is "as little translatable as the guiding-Greek word logos and the Chinese Tao . . . and is … a singulare tantum." And yet we opted for translating Ereignis rather than leaving it untranslated, (…)

Excertos do capítulo II de THE MYSTICAL ELEMENT IN HEIDEGGER’S THOUGHT, p. 47-49.
The point of departure for our study of the mystical element in Heidegger’s thought is the course of lectures which Heidegger gave at Freiburg in 1955-56 and which he published under the title The Principle of Ground (Der Satz vom Grund). The text consists of a series of thirteen course lectures and a concluding address on the subject of this famous principle of Leibniz. "nothing is without reason" (nihil (…)