Hermenêutica

O que é objetivação, objetivar? A esse respeito responde Heidegger numa carta de 11.03.1964 endereçada aos participantes de um diálogo teológico sobre O problema de um pensar e falar não objetivantes na teologia, hoje: Objetivar "é fazer algo objeto, pô-lo como objeto e somente assim o representar. E o que significa objeto? Na Idade Média obiectum significava o que é lançado e mantido de encontro em face do aperceber, da imaginação, do julgar, desejar e mirar. Em contraste com isso, (…)

A palavra autonomia é grega e se compõe de auto e nomia. E significa independência, liberdade, o modo de ser dos que vivem segundo a sua própria lei. A palavra auto significa mesmo, em si, por e para si, pessoalmente, a partir de si. Mas propriamente auto indica um movimento, o movimento que podemos circunscrever como erguer-se a si mesmo, destacar-se, realçar-se, alçar-se, colocar-se a si mesmo a partir de si. Nomia vem de nomos, que usualmente traduzimos por lei, prescrição, ordem, mas (…)

Costumamos representar o relacionamento mútuo entre as próprias ciências, entre as ciências, a filosofia e a teologia, num esquema que representa diante de nós o objeto (realidade, a coisa, o campo, a região, a área etc.) sobre o qual as ciências, a filosofia, a teologia empostam a mirada do seu ponto de vista e cada qual, as ciências, a filosofia, a teologia capta um aspecto parcial desse objeto. E ajuntando-se os resultados dessas captações temos um conhecimento cada vez mais global. Por (…)

This commentary has been circulating in gradually changing versions for over twenty years. It started in 1968 as a set of “Fybate Lecture Notes” transcribed from my course on Being and Time at the University of California, Berkeley. In 1975 I started circulating my updated lecture notes to students and anyone else who was interested. For a decade thereafter I revised the notes each year, incorporating and responding to what I learned from my students and teaching assistants. By 1985 there (…)

2. Mental Representation. To the classic assumption that beliefs and desires underlie and explain human behavior, Descartes adds that in order for us to perceive, act, and, in general, relate to objects, there must be some content in our minds — some internal representation — that enables us to direct our minds toward each object. This "intentional content" of consciousness has been investigated in the first half of this century by Husserl and more recently by John Searle.
Heidegger (…)

Original
3. Theoretical Holism. Plato’s view that everything human beings do that makes any sense at all is based on an implicit theory, combined with the Descartes/Husserl view that this theory is represented in our minds as intentional states and rules for relating them, leads to the view that even if a background of shared practices is necessary for intelligibility, one can rest assured that one will be able to analyze that background in terms of further mental states. Insofar as (…)

Original
5. Methodological Individualism. Heidegger follows Wilhelm Dilthey in emphasizing that the meaning and organization of a culture must be taken as the basic given in the social sciences and philosophy and cannot be traced back to the activity of individual subjects. Thus Heidegger rejects the methodological individualism that extends from Descartes to Husserl to existentialists such as the pre-Marxist Sartre and many contemporary American social philosophers. In his emphasis on the (…)

It should thus be clear that tools are not neutral, and that using the Net diminishes one’s involvement in the physical and social world. This, in turn, diminishes one’s sense of reality and of the meaning in one’s life. Indeed, it seems that, the more we use the Net, the more it will tend to draw us into the unreal, lonely, and meaningless world of those who want to flee all the ills that flesh is heir to.
If, however, one is already committed to a cause, the World Wide Web can increase (…)

Original
At this point someone is sure to object that in spite of his interest in our shared, everyday practices, Heidegger, unlike Wittgenstein, uses very unordinary language. Why does Heidegger need a special, technical language to talk about common sense? The answer is illuminating.
To begin with, Heidegger and Wittgenstein have a very different understanding of the background of everyday activity. Wittgenstein is convinced that the practices that make up the human form of life are a (…)

1. Explicitness. Western thinkers from Socrates to Kant to Jürgen Habermas have assumed that we know and act by applying principles and have concluded that we should get clear about these presuppositions so that we can gain enlightened control of our lives. Heidegger questions both the possibility and the desirability of making our everyday understanding totally explicit. He introduces the idea that the shared everyday skills, discriminations, and practices into which we are socialized (…)