And here is where I get stuck, and where we all get stuck. For the very same movement which put us in possession of the powers that have now to be regulated by norms — the movement of modern knowledge called science — has by a necessary complementarity eroded the foundations from which norms could be derived; it has destroyed the very idea of norm as such. Not, fortunately, the feeling for norm and even for particular norms. But this feeling becomes uncertain of itself when contradicted by (…)
João Cardoso de Castro (doutor Bioética - UFRJ) e Murilo Cardoso de Castro (doutor Filosofia - UFRJ)
Matérias mais recentes
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Jonas (1980) – Technology and Responsibility…(IX)
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de Castro -
Jonas (1980) – Technology and Responsibility…(VIII)
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de CastroThe ethically relevant common feature in all the examples adduced is what I like to call the inherently "utopian" drift of our actions under the conditions of modern technology, whether it works on non-human or on human nature, and whether the "utopia" at the end of the road be planned or unplanned. By the kind and size of its snowballing effects, technological power propels us into goals of a type that was formerly the preserve of Utopias. To put it differently, technological power has (…)
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Jonas (1980) – Technology and Responsibility…(VII)
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de CastroSimilar comparisons could be made with all the other historical forms of the ethics of contemporaneity and immediacy. The new order of human action requires a commensurate ethics of foresight and responsibility, which is as new as are the issues with which it has to deal. We have seen that these are the issues posed by the works of homo faber in the age of technology. But among those novel works we haven’t mentioned yet the potentially most ominous class. We have considered techne only as (…)
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Jonas (1980) – Technology and Responsibility…(VI)
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de CastroKant’s categorical imperative said: "Act so that you can will that the maxim of your action be made the principle of a universal law." The "can" here invoked is that of reason and its consistency with itself: Given the existence of a community of human agents (acting rational beings), the action must be such that it can without self-contradiction be imagined as a general practice of that community. Mark that the basic reflection of morals here is not itself a moral but a logical one: The "I (…)
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Jonas (1980) – Technology and Responsibility…(V)
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de CastroReturning to strictly intra-human considerations, there is another ethical aspect to the growth of techne as a pursuit beyond the pragmatically limited terms of former times. Then, so we found, techne was a measured tribute to necessity, not the road to mankind’s chosen goal — a means with a finite measure of adequacy to well-defined proximate ends. Now, techne in the form of modern technology has turned into an infinite forward-thrust of the race, its most significant enterprise, in whose (…)
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Jonas (1980) – Technology and Responsibility…(IV)
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de CastroAll this has decisively changed. Modern technology has introduced actions of such novel scale, objects, and consequences that the framework of former ethics can no longer contain them. The Antigone chorus on the demotes, the wondrous power, of man would have to read differently now; and its admonition to the individual to honor the laws of the land would no longer be enough. To be sure, the old prescriptions of the "neighbor" ethics — of justice, charity, honesty, and so on — still hold in (…)
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Jonas (1980) – Technology and Responsibility…(III)
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de CastroIt follows that the knowledge that is required — besides the moral will — to assure the morality of action, fitted these limited terms: it was not the knowledge of the scientist or the expert, but knowledge of a kind readily available to all men of good will. Kant went so far as to say that "human reason can, in matters of morality, be easily brought to a high degree of accuracy and completeness even in the most ordinary intelligence" ; that "there is no need of science or philosophy for (…)
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Jonas (1980) – Technology and Responsibility…(II)
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de CastroLet us extract from the preceding those characteristics of human action which are relevant for a comparison with the state of things today.
1. All dealing with the non-human world, i.e., the whole realm of techne (with the exception of medicine), was ethically neutral - in respect both of the object and the subject of such action: in respect of the object, because it impinged but little on the self-sustaining nature of things and thus raised no question of permanent injury to the integrity (…) -
Jonas (1980) – Technology and Responsibility…(I)
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de CastroThe novel powers I have in mind are, of course, those of modern technology. My first point, accordingly, is to ask how this technology affects the nature of our acting, in what ways it makes acting under its dominion different from what it has been through the ages. Since throughout those ages man was never without technology, the question involves the human difference of modern from previous technology. Let us start with an ancient voice on man’s powers and deeds which in an archetypal (…)
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Deleuze (1997) – Um precursor desconhecido de Heidegger, Alfred Jarry
19 de novembro de 2024, por Cardoso de CastroA Patafísica (epi meta ta phusika) tem precisa e explicitamente o seguinte objeto: a grande Virada, a superação da metafísica, o remontar para além ou para aquém, “a ciência do que se acrescenta à metafísica, seja em si mesma, seja fora de si, estendendo-se tão longe para além da metafísica quanto esta da física”. Desse modo, pode-se considerar a obra de Heidegger como um desenvolvimento da patafísica conforme os princípios de Sofrotates, o armênio, e de seu primeiro discípulo, Alfred Jarry. (…)
