Being as such (Sein als solches), 7fn, 85fn, 146, 187fn, 207fn, 230 [BTJS GA2
Sein und Zeit
SZ
SuZ
S.u.Z.
Être et temps
Ser e Tempo
Being and Time
Ser y Tiempo
EtreTemps
STMS
STFC
BTMR
STJR
BTJS
ETFV
STJG
ETJA
ETEM Sein und Zeit (1927), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p. Revised 2018. [GA2] / Sein und Zeit (1927), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1967. / Sein und Zeit. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972 ]

We can immediately say that according to Heidegger, the meaning of categorial intuition is that the totality of our intentional life is always already shaped by categorial elements, and that the relevant categorial shape of all the correlative intentional objectities is a surplus, something exceeding sensory contents. Moreover, this surplus is itself given in intuition of a peculiar kind, as discovered by Husserl Husserl
Edmund Husserl EDMUND HUSSERL (1859-1938) ; namely, categorial intuition. Thus, intentionality is in the end a transcendence that originally relates not to mere sensory items but to objective (i.e., self-standing, not subjectively produced) structures that make these items appear as parts of intentional entities. Now, a priori in intentionality is this very objective structuring that always already regulates our most original experiencing. Regionally seen, this a priori is the Being of the beings experienced by us as belonging to each of the various ontological spheres. All these regional Beings of the corresponding beings, however, must be capable of being seen from the ultimate universal perspective of some Being in general (Sein überhaupt) or Being as such (Sein als solches), qua a priori of the a priories. Otherwise, as Heidegger Platonically insinuates, we could not be in any position to comprehend and experience these different Beings as differing Beings. [HHRPC]