Ek-sistenz, ex-sistência, ek-sistência, Ek-sistence, ex-sistente, ex-sistir

A Existenz de Heidegger ou, como ele passa a escrever, Ek-sistenz, não deve ser confundida com a "existência" de Sartre  . "Existência" é a existentia no sentido da escolástica, que se opõe à "essência" ou essentia. Sartre   simplesmente inverte a ordem destes termos. Ek-sistenz, como o próprio "ser", é anterior à distinção entre "existência" e "essência", e significa "colocar-se adiante" para dentro da "verdade do ser". Por um lado, o humanismo superestima o papel do homem, colocando-o no centro do universo, e acessando tudo a partir do ponto-de-vista do homem. Por outro lado, subestima seu papel. Não reconhece que o homem não é apenas um ente dentre outros, mas o ente que, antes de tudo, abre um Mundo, ou os entes como um todo. Para o humanismo, o homem é a criança mimada que pensa que todos os brinquedos da loja são para ele. Para Heidegger, o homem é o empresário que fundou e sustenta a loja de brinquedos, resistindo à tentação de consumir seus conteúdos. [Inwood  , DH  ]

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In the twelfth century, in Richard of Saint-Victor’s canonical distinction ( De Trinitate [1148], 4.12.937C–983 ) we find the echo, amplified and transposed onto a metaphysical and theological level, of this first concrete meaning of the Latin verb exsisto:

 Now, with the term “existence” we can refer to both [of these] considerations: one concerning the essence’s nature and another concerning the nature of obtaining [it]. I mean, [we can refer to] both [the consideration] in which [every being] seeks that which it is in itself and [the consideration] in which every being tries to know from where it derives its being. The word “existence” comes from the [Latin] verb existere. We observe that the term sistere refers to the first consideration. Equally, we can notice that by adding the preposition ex [the word] refers [in meaning] to the second consideration. When we say that something exists—( in the meaning of sistere )—those realities, which do not derive their being from themselves but have it from someone [else], are immediately excluded. [These realities] do not really “ex-ist”—so to speak—but they rather “in-sist,” that is, they are joined to some [other] subject. The term sistere, however, seems to be appropriate to both of them: both to that which subsists in some way, [and] to that which cannot subsist in any way; both to that which is necessarily subordinated and to that which cannot be [subordinated] in any way. In effect, the first condition is proper to the created nature, the second to the uncreated nature, since that which is not created subsists in itself in such a way that nothing in it can be found, as [if it were its own operating] subject. For this reason, the word sistere can refer to both the created and uncreated nature. The term ex-sistere, on its part, not only expresses the possession of being, but also the [being’s] coming from outside. [It expresses] the fact that one possesses its being because of someone [else]. Indeed, this is shown in the compounded verb, by the preposition that is added to it. What does existere mean, in fact, if not sistere “from” ( = ex ) someone? That is, [what does it mean if not] receiving one’s own substantial being from someone [else]? Consequently, with this single verb existere—or with the single noun “existence”—we can intend both that which has to do with the object’s nature and that which refers to its own origin.

  [BCDU  ]