GA15 GA15
GA 15
GA XV
GA15FR
GA15EN Seminare (1951–1973), ed. Curd Ochwadt, 1. Aufl 1986. 2., durchgesehene Aufl 2005. 312; GA20 GA20
GA20ES
GA20EN Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Sommersemester 1925), ed. Petra Jaeger, 1. Auflage 1979. 2., durchgesehene Auflage 1988. 3., durchgesehene Auflage 1994. 225; GA22 GA22
CFFA
GA 22
GA XXII
GAP
CFPA
BCAP
GA22RR
GA22GJ
GA22AB
GA22J Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie (SS 1926) [1993] — Conceitos fundamentais da Filosofia Antiga — Traducción de Germán Jiménez, Buenos Aires, Waldhuter, 2014 — Translated by Richard Rojcewicz, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2008. 286; GA26 GA26
PML
PMLogik
GA26JGN
GA26MH
GA 26
GA XXVI
MALAL Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (SS 1928) [1978] — Princípios Metafísicos da Lógica 167; GA27 GA27
GA 27
GA XXVII
GA27PT
GA27ES Einleitung in die Philosophie (WS 1928-1929) [1996] 209; GA28 GA28
GA 28
GA XXVIII Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart (SS 1929) [1997] 145, 171; GA42 GA42
GA 42
GA XLII
GA42AR
SS 1936
GA42ES
GA42FR
GA42EN Schelling: Vom das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) (SS 1936) [1988] — Schelling: Da essência da liberdade humana 160, 162; GA61 GA61
GA 61
GA LXI
GA61EPG
GA61JAE
GA61RR
WS 1921-1922 Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (WS 1921-1922) [1985] 97; GA65 GA65
GA 65
GA LXV
GA65EM
GA65AM
GA65DPC
GA65DP
GA65DVP
GA65PT
GA65FR
GA65IT BEITRAGE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE - Contribuições à Filosofia 428, 478. [HC]

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Meditating Aristotle Aristoteles
Aristote
Aristóteles
Aristotle Para Heidegger, Aristóteles é com efeito toda a filosofia, por esta razão passou sua vida a situar, demarcar, mensurar, em resumo questionar em sua dimensão mesma de lugar, este lugar comum a toda humanidade. in these years [before SZ GA2
Sein und Zeit
SZ
SuZ
S.u.Z.
Être et temps
Ser e Tempo
Being and Time
Ser y Tiempo
EtreTemps
STMS
STFC
BTMR
STJR
BTJS
ETFV
STJG
ETJA
ETEM Sein und Zeit (1927), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p. Revised 2018. [GA2] / Sein und Zeit (1927), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1967. / Sein und Zeit. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972 ], Heidegger probed deeper the problem of τί τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν. Augustine Augustin
Agostinho
Augustine AURÉLIO AGOSTINHO DE HIPONA (354-430). Em Agostinho, H. encontra um respondente a suas preocupações relativas à existência, ou melhor, à ancoragem da reflexão filosófica na dimensão da existência como do mundo concreto no seio do qual o ser humano é levado a desdobrar seu ser, a viver. (LDMH) , however, gave him a new insight: that man is not a being [Seiende] like other beings [Seienden] but enjoys a prerogative all his own by reason of which his own Being [Sein] is not from the beginning a fait accompli but something that he himself must achieve, a task in which he can default.

During this time, too, Heidegger saw more and more clearly that the dichotomy between realism [Realismus] and idealism [Idealismus] was thoroughly inadequate. Realism [Realismus], as a philosophical tendency, assumes, with an appeal to the example of ancient and mediaeval thinkers, that the being-ness [Seiendheit] of beings [Seienden] can be discerned without further ado in the beings [Seienden] themselves which lie before man as simple entities (Vorhandene). Idealism [Idealismus], as a philosophical tendency, sees the origin of all being-ness [Seiendheit] in thought [Denken], or consciousness, which alone supplies a unity for the multiplicity of beings [Seienden], thereby allowing each individual the sense it has in relation to the whole ensemble. Heidegger saw that the problem had to be posed on a different level in terms of an intimate correlation between the Being-process [Sein] and man, by reason of which the “sense’1 of beings [Seienden] was something more than mere entity, yet also more than the fabrication of consciousness. This would demand, however, an analysis of man in his relationship to Being [Sein] that would shatter the realist-idealist dilemma by overcoming the subject-ism [Subjektität] that lay at its roots. [RHPT RHPT Richardson, William. J.. Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought. New York: Fordham University Press, 2003 :27-28]

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Quer dizer, a questão do idealismo [Idealismus] – que seria o caráter transcendental puro – e a questão do realismo [Realismus] – que seria o caráter da singularidade pura [Einzelnheit] – estão, de certo modo, superadas. O Dasein se conduz por esquemas [Schema] práticos e, como já sempre compreende o ente [Seiende], sob o fundo da compreensão de ser [Seinsverständnis], ele garante a aplicação, via regras que o Dasein segue, dos conceitos ao singular [Einzelnheit]. Então podemos falar, em Heidegger, numa transcendentalidade histórica. Heidegger opera a transformação da analítica transcendental [transzendentale Analytik] em analítica existencial [existenziale Analytik], no sentido, em que, de certo modo, a analítica transcendental esconde em si uma ideia de infinitude [Unendlichkeit], enquanto a analítica existencial é a afirmação da finitude [Endlichkeit]. [ESVerdade:37]

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