Wrathall (2021:108-109) – em-si inalcançável

We surely should indeed resist the thought that our thinking is parochial — or otherwise less-than-objective — simply by virtue of being “restricted” to addressing entities “within a definite kind of seeing” of them. To be free of such a “restriction” — in order to glimpse, as we might imagine, the “in-itself” — would seem to be to ask of the world a question that is not “adequately defined,” asking how it is — how it is ordered — but with no answer to the prior question, “Ordered with regard to what?” (GA21 GA21
GA 21
GA XXI
GA21EN
GA21ES Lógica. A pergunta pela verdade. / Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (Wintersemester 1925/1926), ed. Walter Biemel, 1. Auflage 1976. 2., durchgesehene Auflage 1995. :284). So one possibility worth exploring is that Heidegger’s viewpoint opposes only “an utterly fantastic kind of objectivity,” the unattainability of which provides no reason to believe we cannot attain objectivity properly understood: from this perspective, one might well say that “inferring relativism and skeptical historicism from the [109] fact that an ‘in-itself’ cannot be found is only the flip-side of the same misunderstanding” (GA62 GA62
GA 62
GA LXII
SS 1922 Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005] :372/171, 372/172).

[WRATHALL Wrathall
Mark Wrathall
CCHBT
CHL WRATHALL, Mark A. , Mark A.. The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021]