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Wrathall (2021:107-108) – objetos, meras coisas ou significativos
quarta-feira 13 de novembro de 2024
[…] these reflections draw on the vision that the Metaphysics offers (see A 1 981b23) of science emerging out of a certain leisure, of humanity “releasing itself from its tendencies to direct itself to its routine tasks” to instead utake a break and make a sojourn” (GA62
GA62
GA 62
GA LXII
SS 1922
Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005]
:354/160). Such an insistence on “objects in the sense of mere things” “emerging” only out of objects being “originally there for [us] as objects as meaningful [als bedeutsame]” (GA62
GA62
GA 62
GA LXII
SS 1922
Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005]
:354/160) finds echoes in Being and Time
GA2
Sein und Zeit
SZ
SuZ
S.u.Z.
Être et temps
Ser e Tempo
Being and Time
Ser y Tiempo
EtreTemps
STMS
STFC
BTMR
STJR
BTJS
ETFV
STJG
ETJA
ETEM
Sein und Zeit (1927), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p. Revised 2018. [GA2] / Sein und Zeit (1927), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1967. / Sein und Zeit. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972
’s discussion of the “change-over” from dealing with the available to our coming to observe the occurrent (SZ
GA2
Sein und Zeit
SZ
SuZ
S.u.Z.
Être et temps
Ser e Tempo
Being and Time
Ser y Tiempo
EtreTemps
STMS
STFC
BTMR
STJR
BTJS
ETFV
STJG
ETJA
ETEM
Sein und Zeit (1927), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p. Revised 2018. [GA2] / Sein und Zeit (1927), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1967. / Sein und Zeit. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972
357). But how we are to understand this “change-over” is a difficult question.
One might wonder, for example, whether Heidegger can make sense of Dasein encountering “mere things” if entities are given “on the path of care”; and when Heidegger characterizes such a “sojourning” as “in and for the basic movement of those dealings characterized by concern” (GA62
GA62
GA 62
GA LXII
SS 1922
Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005]
:355/161), this may prompt the reaction that many — beginning perhaps with Husserl
Husserl
Edmund Husserl
EDMUND HUSSERL (1859-1938)
— have had to Being and Time
GA2
Sein und Zeit
SZ
SuZ
S.u.Z.
Être et temps
Ser e Tempo
Being and Time
Ser y Tiempo
EtreTemps
STMS
STFC
BTMR
STJR
BTJS
ETFV
STJG
ETJA
ETEM
Sein und Zeit (1927), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p. Revised 2018. [GA2] / Sein und Zeit (1927), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1967. / Sein und Zeit. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972
: that we must argue “against Heidegger” to secure science’s status as not tied to “any necessity of life” but instead as capable of simply “look[ing] at things, and wanting] to know things,” things with which it need have “nothing to do” (unpublished note of [108] Husserl
Husserl
Edmund Husserl
EDMUND HUSSERL (1859-1938)
’s translated and quoted in Moran
Moran
Dermot Moran
MORAN, Dermot
2000,183). From such a perspective, Heidegger’s depiction of Dasein as living in a world which it has “always already … taken up in care in one way or another” seems to save us from the spectre of Cartesian skepticism, but only by sacrificing our claim to objective knowledge, knowledge of the world “conceived of in terms of the objectivity of nature that has been stripped of all meaningfulness [der bedeutsamkeitsverarmten Gegenständlichkeit der Natur]” (GA62
GA62
GA 62
GA LXII
SS 1922
Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005]
:355/161), a knowledge stripped of what we might think of as the parochial concerns of a creature “caught in meaningfulness.”
[…]
Heidegger did indeed stress in Being and Time
GA2
Sein und Zeit
SZ
SuZ
S.u.Z.
Être et temps
Ser e Tempo
Being and Time
Ser y Tiempo
EtreTemps
STMS
STFC
BTMR
STJR
BTJS
ETFV
STJG
ETJA
ETEM
Sein und Zeit (1927), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p. Revised 2018. [GA2] / Sein und Zeit (1927), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1967. / Sein und Zeit. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972
that, although “looking at the world theoretically” “dim[s] down” “the specific worldhood” of the “available” to “the uniformity of what is purely occurrent,” “this uniformity comprises a new abundance of things” (SZ
GA2
Sein und Zeit
SZ
SuZ
S.u.Z.
Être et temps
Ser e Tempo
Being and Time
Ser y Tiempo
EtreTemps
STMS
STFC
BTMR
STJR
BTJS
ETFV
STJG
ETJA
ETEM
Sein und Zeit (1927), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p. Revised 2018. [GA2] / Sein und Zeit (1927), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1967. / Sein und Zeit. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972
138); and already in the early discussions sketched above, what Heidegger sees emerge from science’s Aristotelian “sojourn” is “an autonomous form of dealings with” the world (GA62
GA62
GA 62
GA LXII
SS 1922
Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005]
:354/160). But to assess whether such a stance is really available to Heidegger, key issues are how we understand the “founding” of scientific knowledge in “being-in” and the sense in which the objects of such knowledge are “stripped of all meaningfulness.”
[WRATHALL
Wrathall
Mark Wrathall
CCHBT
CHL
WRATHALL, Mark A.
, Mark A. The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon. Cambridge New York (N.Y.): Cambridge university press, 2021]
Ver online : Mark Wrathall