McNeill (2018) – destruição

As we have seen, Heidegger developed his conception of destruction well before Being and Time GA2
Sein und Zeit
SZ
SuZ
S.u.Z.
Être et temps
Ser e Tempo
Being and Time
Ser y Tiempo
EtreTemps
STMS
STFC
BTMR
STJR
BTJS
ETFV
STJG
ETJA
ETEM Sein und Zeit (1927), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977, XIV, 586p. Revised 2018. [GA2] / Sein und Zeit (1927), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1967. / Sein und Zeit. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972 . Although the first appearance of the term Destruktion is a mention in the course on Basic Problems of Phenomenology from winter semester 1919–1920 (GA58 GA58
GA 58
GA LVIII
WS 1919-1920
KNSWS 1919-1920
KNS
Kriegsnotsemester Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (WS 1919-1920) [1992] — Problemas Fundamentais da Fenomenologia (1919-1920). KNS = Kriegsnotsemester , 139), the theme is already anticipated the previous semester, in his course on Phenomenological and Transcendental Philosophy of Value in summer semester 1919, where Heidegger insists on the critical import of phenomenology. The idea of phenomenological critique, which would soon become understood as destruction, was, however, not to be taken in a negative sense, Heidegger insisted. Although Heidegger here presents the concept of phenomenological critique in Husserlian terms—its criterion is “the evidentiary understanding of lived experiences, of living in and for itself in the eidos ”—it is concerned neither with logical proof and refutation, nor with theoretically imposed criteria, but rather with historical questions of provenance (Herkunft) and motivation (GA56-57 GA56-57
GA 56-57
GA LVI-LVII
SS 1919 Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie. 1. Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem (post war semester 1919); 2. Phänomenologie und transzendentale Wertphilosophie (SS 1919); 3. Anhang: Über das Wesen der Universität und akademischen Studiums (SS 1919) [1987] , 125–26). By the summer semester of 1920, in his course on Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, the idea of phenomenological critique had become what Heidegger explicitly called that of “phenomenological-critical destruction” (GA59 GA59
GA 59
GA LIX
SS 1920 Phänomenologie der Anschauung und Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung (SS 1920) — Fenomenologia da Intuição e da Expressão , 29). A couple of years later, in his treatise Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle Aristoteles
Aristote
Aristóteles
Aristotle Para Heidegger, Aristóteles é com efeito toda a filosofia, por esta razão passou sua vida a situar, demarcar, mensurar, em resumo questionar em sua dimensão mesma de lugar, este lugar comum a toda humanidade. (Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation) (1922), Heidegger further clarified his notion of historical critique intrinsic to phenomenology in terms of the need for a “critique of the present”: “Critique of history is always only critique of the present. . . . History gets negated not because it is ‘false,’ but because it still remains effective in the present without, however, being able to be an authentically appropriated present” (GA62 GA62
GA 62
GA LXII
SS 1922 Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005] , 350–51). The phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity, Heidegger insists in the same text, can occur “only on the path of destruction”; and the latter is conceived as essentially regressive, as a “deconstructive regress ” (abbauenden Rückgang) that will penetrate into the “original motivational sources” underlying the traditional concepts and categories used to interpret factical life (GA62 GA62
GA 62
GA LXII
SS 1922 Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005] , 368). Destruction is “‘ historical ’ knowing [‘historisches’ Erkennen] in the radical sense of the term”; it is philosophy’s “destructive confrontation [destructive Auseinandersetzung] with its own history [Geschichte].” As such, it is not a return to the past, but “the authentic path upon which the present needs to encounter itself in its own fundamental movements [Grundbewegtheiten],” that is, in what moves and is at work in the very happening of the present at its most fundamental level (GA62 GA62
GA 62
GA LXII
SS 1922 Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik (SS 1922) [2005] , 368).

[William McNeill McNeill
William McNeill WILLIAM MCNEILL (1961) . "The Fate of Phenomenology : Heidegger’s Legacy", in FRIED, G.; POLT Polt
Richard Polt POLT, Richard , R. (EDS.). After Heidegger? London ; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018]